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China's Indigenous Innovation Policies
Under the TRIPS and GPA Agreements and
Alternatives for Promoting Economic Growth
S. James Boumil III*

Abstract
China's intricate web of Indigenous Innovationpolicies affords preferences in government
procurement to certain high-technologyproducts whose intellectualpropertyis owned or registered
in China. While the the policies were intended to strengthen China's national economy, they
have been heavily criticiZed, notably by the US and the EU, as a strategic attempt to
commercialiZe non-Chineseproprietary ideas in China and as a trade barrier that harms all
stakeholders in the world marketplace. Although China's State Council recently committed the
county to repealing several key Indigenous Innovation measures, the extent to which Indigenous
Innovation preferences will be implemented by the local Chinese governments, which have
signicant autonomy in administering national poliy measures, remains elusive. This
Comment anayZes the legal status of Indigenous Innovationpolicies under the TRIPS and the
GPA Agreements, examines the economic and policy goals underlying the policies, and
concludes by considering alternative and mutually preferable solutions that would allow both
China and itsforeign competitors to achieve their technological and economicgrowth objectives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
China has recently escalated its efforts to transition from a manufacturingbased economy fueled by an abundance of cheap labor to an innovation-based
economy driven by expanding its foundation of domestically owned intellectual
property (IP).' Many commentators consider this strategy essential to bolstering
China's long-term economic growth in the twenty-first century.2 One of China's
controversial growth tactics has been to develop a web of Indigenous
Innovation Policies, which institute preferences in government procurement for
certain high-technology (high-tech) products whose IP is owned or registered in
China.3 These policies have been heavily criticized, most notably by the US and
the EU, both as a strategic attempt to commercialize non-Chinese proprietary
ideas in China and as a trade barrier that is harmful to all players in the world

1

See Eve Y. Zhou and Bob Stembridge, Patentedin China: The Presentand Future State of Innovation in
at
online
2008),
Scientific
Reuters
(Thomson
*3
China,
http://ip.thomsonreuters.com/media/pdfs/WIPTChina08.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2011).

2

See id.

3

Broadly speaking, Indigenous Innovation Policies refer to a host of interrelated People's Republic
of China government policies aimed at fostering innovation within China, which utilize a range of
strategies. The focus of this Comment, however, is specifically the 2006 policies implementing
government procurement preferences. See Section III.
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marketplace.4 The policies also potentially contravene several of China's WTO
obligations and commitments, including certain provisions of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)' and the
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).'
Indigenous Innovation has received substantially greater attention from
media across the globe and Western leaders in the last year as the international
community continues to pressure China into abandoning its controversial
growth tactics.' In response, China's chief governing authority, the State
Council,' recently committed to repealing several key measures of the
Indigenous Innovation Policies.' These actions may represent significant
progress toward an amicable resolution of the tension surrounding the policies.
However, it is still unclear whether and to what extent Indigenous Innovation
preferences will be implemented by the local Chinese governments, which have
significant autonomy in administering national policy measures.' 0 It is also
unclear whether China's commitment represents political posturing, stalling, or a
genuine effort on China's part to come into WTO compliance."

4

See Section III.B.

5

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C (1994), 1869 UN Treaty Ser 299 (1994)
(TRIPS).
Agreement on Government Procurement (Apr 15, 1994), Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 4(b) (1994), 1915 UN Treaty Ser 103 (1994) (GPA).

6

7

8
9

10

11

See, for example, Annie Wei, China's Indigenous Innovation Policies: No Eay Solutions (Beijing Today
at
http://www.beijingtoday.com.cn/blogger/communityonline
15,
2010),
Apr
(visited
blogger/anniewei/chinaE2%80%99s-indigenous-innovation-policies-no-easy-solutions
Oct 27, 2011); Edward Wong, China: Rules Favoring Local Companiesfor State Contracts Will Be Eased
at
online
30,
2011),
June
Times
(New
York
http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/07/01 /world/asia/01briefs-China.html (visited Oct 27, 2011);
Dustin Ensinger, China's Indigenous Innovation Polg Source of Poliical Tension (Economy in Crisis
August 9, 2010), online at http://economyincrisis.org/content/chinas-indigenous-innovationpolicy-source-political-tension (visited October 8, 2011); Juliana Gruenwald, Firms Urge China to
Repeal Indigenous Innovation Policy, (National Journal May 10, 2010), online at
(visited
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2010/05/firms-urge-china-to-repeal-ind.php
October 8, 2011).
See The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, The State Council (2006),
online at http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-03/16/content_921792.htm (visited Oct 27, 2011).
See Michael Standaert, China Drops Three Measures On Promoting 7ndgenous Innovation' International
Trade Daily (July 7, 2011).
See The US--China Business Council, Comments on the April 2010 Draft Notice on the Launch of the
National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work *24 (May 10, 2010), online at
http://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2010/05/uscbcmost-circular-comments.pdf
(visited Oct 27, 2011) (USCBC April 2010 Comments).
See Stanley Lubman, Changes to China's 'Indigenous Innovation' Polig: Don't Get Too Excited, China
at
online
22,
2011),
Network July
St J: Digital
(Wall
Realtime
Report
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This Comment analyzes the legal status of the Indigenous Innovation
Policies under TRIPS and briefly examines conflicts that would arise under the
GPA if China eventually ratifies the GPA.12 This Comment begins by examining
the economic rationale behind China's desire to institute its Indigenous
Innovation Policies. It then outlines the content of the important provisions of
the Policies. Next it conducts a legal analysis under the TRIPS and the GPA
Agreements. This Comment concludes by examining the economics and policy
goals underlying the Indigenous Innovation Policies and considering alternative,
mutually preferable solutions that would allow both China and its foreign
competitors to achieve their technological and economic growth objectives.
II. BACKGROUND: THE DESIRE FOR INDIGENOUS
INNOVATION
A. China's Evolving Role in the World Marketplace
Known for decades as "the world's factory," China has capitalized upon its
abundance of low-cost labor to manufacture the staples of daily life at prices that
significantly undercut those produced by its Western competitors." Over the last
thirty years, China's manufacturing capabilities have evolved to include the
production of a wide range of high-tech devices and consumer electronics,
thanks to a host of foreign direct investors (FDIs) from the US and EU that
have infused enormous capital into the development of China's industrial base. 14
These large companies continue to innovate in their countries of origin while
manufacturing their products in China much more cheaply than would be
possible in most other regions.' 5
Although China has enjoyed significant industrial development in the last
several decades, it continues to be confined largely to a manufacturing role. This
low-value-added model causes China's attendant profits to pale in comparison

12
13
14

15

http://blogs.wsj.com/chinareatime/2011/07/22/changes-to-chinas-indigenous-innovationpolicy-dont-get-too-excited/ (visited Oct 27, 2011).
China committed to ratifying the GPA when it joined the WTO in 2001, although its first two
proposals in 2007 and 2010 were rejected. See Section IV.
Alex Frew McMillan, China's Role as 'World's Factory' Coming to an End (CNBC Feb 6, 2011), online
at http://www.cnbc.com/id/41035650/ (visited Oct 27, 2011).
See Guoqiang Long, Chinas Poklies on FDI: Does FDI Promote Development?, online at
http://www.piie.com/publications/chapterspreview/3810/12iie3810.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2011);
US-China Business Council, Foreign Direct Investment in China (1996-2011), online at
http://www.uschina.org/statistics/fdi-cumulative.html (visited Oct 27, 2011).
Cong Cao, Challengesfor TechnologicalDevelopment in Cbina's Industry, 54 China Perspectives 2, 3 9
(2004) (China Perspectives).
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with those typically reaped by the owners of the core technologies." Thus,
China experiences large trade deficits in most high-tech sectors, including
electronics and computer-integrated manufacturing.17 Moreover, in recent years
key government officials have expressed heightened fear that dependence on
foreign innovations compromises China's economic and security interests." For
example, China has long objected to US export control laws, particularly as
applied to dual-use technologies, because it believes they limit its domestic
companies' access to essential foreign technology.' 9
Because of this asymmetry, China now places the development of local
technological and innovative capability among its highest priorities.20 The
country's goal is to play a leadership role in the technological revolution of the
twenty-first century by turning itself into an innovation powerhouse.
Successfully employing this strategy is key for China in its efforts to reposition
itself strategically in the global marketplace and to witness sustainable future
economic growth.2'
B. Hurdles on the Road to Innovation
Despite these lofty goals, China remains trapped in an innovation rut for a
variety of reasons. Most significantly, Chinese firms are not generally as
sophisticated as their Western counterparts, and they lack the capacity to

16

17

18

19

20

Richard P. Suttmeier, Cong Cao, and Denis Fred Simon, China's Innovation Challenge and the
Remaking of the Chinese Academy of Science, Vol 1 No 3 MIT Press Journals 78, 79 (2006). For
example, according to one study of China's exports, "the domestic value-added component of the
value of exported electronic and information technology products, while growing, remains quite
low. Even in the most recent years for which data are available, more than 70 [percent] of the
value of these exports is comprised of imported inputs." Lee Branstetter and C. Fritz Foley, Facts
and Fallaciesabout U.S. FDIin China, *20 (National Bureau of Economic Research 2007), online at
http://www.nber.org/books-in-progress/china07/branstetter-foley8-15-07.pdf (visited Oct 27,
2011).
The one exception is biotechnology, where there is a small trade surplus. See China Perspectives
at 5 16 (cited in note 15).
See United States International Trade Commission, China: Intellectual Property Infringement, Indigenous
Innovation Poliies, and Frameworksfor Measuring the Effects on the US Economy, Investigation No 332514 USITC Publication 4199 (amended) 5-3 (2010) (USITC Report).
See id. US export control laws regarding dual-use technologies apply to many products that are
important to US national security but may also have uses that are not related to national security.
See Cong Cao, Richard P. Suttmeier, and Denis Fred Simon, China's 15-Year Science and Technology
Plan, Physics Today 38, 39 (Dec 2006).
See Paul DiPaola and Jerry Li, From 'Made in China" to 'Invented in China" *1 (Bain 2007), online at
http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Public/made% 20in%20chinafor%/200nline/
.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2011).

21

See id.
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understand fully and improve upon many Western innovations.22 As a result,
Chinese firms often find it necessary to import foreign technology as a means of
upgrading production capacity to continue to compete effectively, thereby
leaving less revenue to invest in research and development (R&D).23 By then
foreign firms have often gained an advantage in developing the next stage of
newer and better technologies. The result is a vicious cycle of "importing and
lagging behind" with little ownership of independent IP rights in core
technologies.2 4
A second major hurdle to innovation is that China faces one of the worst
"brain drains" in the world. A recent study indicated that seven out of ten
Chinese students who enroll in a degree program in an overseas university never
return to China.25 China has made efforts to combat this trend, such as the
Thousand Talents program launched in 2009, which provides generous
incentives for top-level researchers and entrepreneurs to return home. 26 Despite
such efforts, China has been unable to mitigate the problem appreciably. 27 A
variety of complex social factors contribute to this growing problem, including a
lower standard of living than those of many countries to which native Chinese
migrate, less appealing healthcare and educational opportunities, and the
country's "only one child" policy. 28
Finally, China has not been able to integrate research institutions effectively
into innovation infrastructures to nearly the degree of countries such as the

22

23

See Linsu Kim, Pros and Cons of InternationalTechnology TransferA Developing Country's View, in Tamir
Agmon and Mary Ann Von Glinow, eds, Technolopg Trangfer in InternationalBusiness 223, 223-39
(Oxford 1991).
According to one study, large- and medium-sized firms have spent an average of 0.5 to 0.8
percent on research and development (R&D). National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of
Science and Technology, ed, China Statistical Yearbook on Sdence and Technology 2003 94, 94-95
(China Statistics 2003). Cao argues that a reasonable guess as to why many Chinese firms have not
spent more on R&D is that they do not have the resources to do so. China Perspectives at 8 24
(cited in note 15).

24

Id.

25

See Jonathan Watts, China Fears Brain Drainas Its Overseas Students Stay Put (The Guardian June 2,
at
online
2007),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/02/internationaleducationnews.highereducation
(visited Oct 27, 2011).
Will
Oremus,
China's Brain Drain (Newsweek
Aug
30,
2010),
online
at
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/30/china-s-brain-drain.html (visited July 16, 2011).

26

27

See id.

28

See Watts, China Fears Brain Drain (cited in note 25); Jonathan Chow, China's Brain Drain
(Shanghaiist July 28, 2009), online at http://shanghaiist.com/2009/07/28/dang-brain-drain.php
(visited Oct 21, 2011).
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US. 29 A cultural conflict between the operational methods of industry and
academia in China may account for this rift." Since faculty in Chinese
universities typically do not innovate for commercial purposes to nearly the
extent that their US counterparts do, Chinese institutions usually tend to develop
abstract ideas that are not patentable and that any company could, in theory,
exploit.3 1 To help remedy this problem, the Tsinghua Science Park in Beijing
provides a forum for businesses and academia to develop closer relationships
with the ultimate goal of commercializing university ideas through developing
spin-off companies.32
C. Previous Attempts at Advancement
One way that Chinese firms historically have gained an edge over their
foreign counterparts is by direct infringement of foreign patents. 33 Because
China is notoriously lax in IP enforcement, it is quite easy-and often
profitable-for Chinese companies simply to free ride off of foreign
innovations.3 4 This lax enforcement policy has recently sparked heightened
controversy. For example, Philips, Sony, and Pioneer initiated litigation in
Europe to pressure Chinese DVD player manufacturers to pay royalties for the
technologies they infringed, resulting in a settlement of US$5 per DVD machine
sold." Such infringements are typical in China, especially in the personal
computer and telecommunications industries.3 6
Finally, the Chinese government has made concerted efforts to force
domestic firms to innovate. In the late 1990s, China implemented policies
requiring technology companies to devote at least 5 percent of annual revenues
to R&D and adopted incentives that would allow R&D to be expensed as
29

See China Perspectives at 8-9 T 27 (cited in note 15).

30

Id.

31

See Zhou Haiyan, Study on the Cooperation of Industry-Academia-Research in China's Construction of
online
at
Group
Corp),
(Xinda
System
*277
Urban
Innovation
http://www.seiofbluemountain.com/upload/product/200911/2008jrhy05al 3.pdf (visited Oct
27, 2011).
See Jeffrey R. Young, Chinese Research Park Incubates Hope for Scholarly Spinoffs (The Chronicle of
Higher Education Sept 14, 2010), online at http://chronicle.com/article/Chinese-ResearchPark/124420 (visited Oct 27, 2011).

32

33
34

See China Perspectives at 2-4 (cited in note 15).
See, for example, Tierryicah Mitchell, Hu Pledges to Protect U.S. Intellectual Property in China: Poltical
Rhetoric or Valid Promise? ( Bus & Intel Prop L Feb 16, 2011), online at
http://ipjournal.law.wfu.edu/2011/02/hu-pledges-to-protect-u-s-intellectual-property-in-chinapolitical-rhetoric-or-valid-promise/(visited Oct 27, 2011).

3s

See China Perspectives at 3

36

See id.
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costs. 7 Additionally, it implemented a technology standard and patent-focused
strategy in enterprise innovation endeavors.3 China's participation in worldwide
3G wireless communications standard setting is one such example."
III. IMPLEMENTING INDIGENOUS INNOVATION
A. A New Policy Framework
In response to these growing concerns, the central Chinese government
formally commenced a policymaking process in 2003 involving over 2,000
Chinese scientists, engineers, and corporate executives with the goal of
transforming China into an "innovation-oriented society" and a global leader in
science and technology. In 2006, this effort culminated in the release of the
Medium- to Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology
(MLP), the central document typically associated with Indigenous Innovation
Policies.41 The MLP contained several essential goals: (1) to establish a system to
qualify Indigenous Innovation products, (2) to establish a procedure for using
government funds to purchase Indigenous Innovation products, and (3) to
devise a plan for treating Indigenous Innovation products preferentially in the
42
government procurement process.
In November 2006, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), the
Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) published "Trial Measures for the Administration of the

37

Seeidat4

38

See id at 10-11

39

See China Perspectives at 11

40

Cao, Suttmeier, and Simon, China's 15-Year Science and Technologe Plan at 38 (cited in note 19).

41

State Council, Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technologv Development (2006-2020)
(China Clean Air Database), online at http://www.chinacleanenergydb.com/general-strategicplans/innovation (visited Oct 27, 2011) (trans unofficial) (MLP). The State Council Leading
Group on Science, Technology, and Education, led by Premier Wen Jiabao, released the MLP in
conjunction with the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) (responsible for leading the
reform of China's science and technology (S&T) system and charged with accrediting indigenous
innovation products and developing indigenous innovation product catalogues), the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (the Chinese government's chief ministry-level
macroscopic planning body), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) (which oversees government
procurement and sets procurement criteria for indigenous innovation products), and the Ministry
of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) (responsible for regulating electronics and
information product manufacturing and crafting industrial policies). See US-China Business
Council, Issue Brief New Developments in China's Domestic Innovation and Procurement Policies (2010),
online at http://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2010/domestic_innovationpolicies.pdf
(visited Oct 27, 2011) (USCBC Issue Brief).
See USCBC Issue Brief at 2-3 (cited in note 41).

42

12.
35.
37 (cited in note 15).
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Accreditation of National Indigenous Innovation Products," 43 which developed
criteria for determining the product models that would receive Indigenous
Innovation status. To qualify, a product must be produced either by (1) an
enterprise that both created and registered its IP in China, or (2) a Chinese
enterprise that obtained the relevant Chinese IP rights or licenses. Additionally,
it must embody a "high degree of creativity and innovation" and offer a "high
degree of reliability and dependable quality" with certification from the China
National Certification Administration (CNCA) or its provincial departmental
branches." In 2009, the Chinese government issued the National Indigenous
Innovation Products Accreditation program, otherwise known as Notice 618,
which implemented the government procurement scheme by providing a forum
for Chinese firms to apply for accreditation and for their approved products to
be published in a catalogue of preferential purchases.45
Another key policy document, "Selected Supporting Policies for the 200620 Medium and Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan
(2006)," confers additional advantages to Indigenous Innovation products in
price-based bidding. If an Indigenous Innovation product is priced higher than
a foreign competitive product, the government must give the local company a
chance to lower its price. If the second offered price matches the best offer, the
Indigenous Innovation product must be selected.47 No equivalent opportunity
for price readjustment is afforded to the foreign bidder.
Finally, the 2007 Evaluation Measures on Indigenous Innovation Products
for Government Procurement (2007 Evaluation Measures) provide explicit price
and technical evaluation preferences to Indigenous Innovation products.4 8 Their
stated purpose was to encourage commercialization of accredited Indigenous
Innovation products by utilizing the government procurement process. 49 First,
Indigenous Innovation products are afforded preference at a margin of 5 to 10
percent in the event that price is the sole determining factor.so Second,

43

See id.

44

Id.

4S

See id at 7, citing PRC Notice Regarding the Launch of the National Indigenous Innovaion Product
Accreditation Work for 2010 (Draftfor Public Comment) (US-China Business Council 2010) (unofficial
at
online
translation),
(visited
http://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2010/04/ii-accreditation-translation.pdf
Oct 27, 2011).

46

See USCBC Issue Brief at 3 (cited in note 41).

47

See id.

48

See id.

49

See id.
See USCBC Issue Brief at 3 (cited in note 41).

50
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Indigenous Innovation products may enjoy an additional 4 to 9 percent boost in
their technical and price evaluations if "comprehensive evaluation methods" (in
other words, methods that take into account technical merit and price to
produce an overall score) are used." Finally, the 2007 Evaluation Measures
establish an explicit government system for initial purchasing and ordering in
order to commercialize Indigenous Innovation products when they are thought
to have market-wide potential in the future.5 2
China instituted these policies against a backdrop of many other preexisting policies that are loosely related to fostering Indigenous Innovation.53 In
fact, the Indigenous Innovation effort is part of a web of interrelated
regulations, including China's technical standards, competition policy under the
antimonopoly law, taxation policy, and IP protection and enforcement rights.54
The complexity and significant overlap in these policies frequently make it
difficult to understand how the different laws are intended to interact with one
another. This Comment, however, will focus primarily on the MLP government
procurement preferences that are outlined above.
B. Concerns of Foreign Companies
The Chinese government estimated that government procurement
contracts surpassed US$100 billion in 2009 (totaling 2 percent of Chinese GDP
and almost 10 percent of Chinese government expenditures).55 As such, many
foreign companies are concerned that the new Indigenous Innovation Policies
will effectively shut them out of China-the world's largest and fastest-growing
market-because they developed or originally registered their IP abroad.
Several US industry representatives have publicly stated that they see
Indigenous Innovation Policies as an even greater threat to business in China
than IP infringement and China's currency exchange rate." In international trade
attorney Terence P. Stewart's testimony before the US-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, he called China's Indigenous Innovation Policies

51

Id.

52

See id.

53

See USITC Report at 5-6-5-7 (cited in note 18).

54

See id.

55

See Loretta Chao, The Big Deal With Procurement (Wall St J: Digital Network July 21, 2010), online
(visited Oct
at http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/07/21/the-big-deal-with-procurement/
27, 2011). The low end does not include significant levels of public investment in infrastructure
projects, which the American Chamber of Commerce in China estimates account for at least 50
percent of total Chinese government procurement, so the closer annual value may be closer to
US$200 billion. See USITC Report at 5-9 (cited in note 18).
See USITC Report at A-3, 5-1 (cited in note 18).

56
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"a clear example of China's attempts to promote industrial policies that favor
Chinese industries while at the same time limiting market access for foreignorigin goods and service providers.""
The growing unrest over the new Chinese Indigenous Innovation Policies
has expanded beyond US firms. One survey of five hundred European
businesses doing significant business in China found that 36 percent believed
Chinese government policies had become less fair in the past two years, pointing
to selective law enforcement, poor IP protection, and the lack of market access
for foreign companies." In addition, the president of the European Chamber of
Commerce accused China of a "growing willingness and tendency to exclude
foreign businesses from the Chinese market." 9 A strongly worded opinion
paper of the European Parliament expresses the full breadth of discontent
churning in the EU over the controversial policies. 60
C. Recent Developments: A Rapidly Evolving Policy
Framework
China's Indigenous Innovation Policies continue to garner strong protests
in the US, the EU, and among international business groups. The Obama
Administration has escalated its criticism of the Policies, elevating the issue to
one of the top priorities for the economic track of the US-China Strategic and
Economic Dialogue (S&ED)." On May 24 and 25, 2010, the US and China met
in Beijing for the Second Round meetings of the SE&D.6 2 According to the

57

58

s9
60

Terence P. Stewart, Evaluating China's Past and Future Role in the World Trade OrganiZation, Testimony
Before US-China Economic and Security Review Commission *7 (June 9, 2010), online at http://
www.uscc.gov/hearings/2010hearings/transcripts/10-06_09_trans/stewart-testimony.pdf
(visited Oct 27, 2011). See also US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2010
Report to Congress n 142 (Nov 2010), online at http://www.uscc.gov/annuaLreport/2010/
annual-report-ful_1O.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2011).
See European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, European ChamberBusiness Confidence Sunvey
2010 *13
(2010), online at http://www.curopeanchamber.com.cn/images/documents/
marketing-departnent/beijing/publications/bcs20l0en-partl.pdf
(visited Oct 27, 2011);
European Business in China Posiion Paper 2009/2010: Executive Summay *6 (2010), online at
http://www.curopeanchamber.com.cn/images/documents/pp_2009201 0/executive summary-en.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2011) (EU Position Paper).
Benjamin A. Shobert, China Faces A Technology Rap (Asia Times Dec 10, 2010), online at
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/LLO2AdO3.htnl (visited Oct 8, 2011).
See Section V.B.3 for a detailed discussion.

61

See Wayne M. Morrison, China-U.S. Trade Issues **1, 26 (Cong Rsrch Serv June 21, 2010), online
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145605.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2011).

62

See US Treasury, Second Meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue joint U.S.-China
Economic
Track
Fact
Sheet,
online
at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/SEDjointeconfactsheet072910.pdf (visited Oct
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Joint Fact Sheet, issued after the discussions, they committed to "reaffirm[ing]
that their innovation policies w[ould] be consistent with the following principles:
non-discrimination; support for market competition and open international
trade and investment; strong enforcement of intellectual property rights; and,
consistent with WTO rules, leaving the terms and conditions of technology
transfer .. . to agreement between individual enterprises.""
On December 14 and 15, 2010, at the twenty-first session of the US-China
Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (CCT), China and the US agreed to
adopt policies that would not discriminate against products or processes
developed under the protection of the IP law of each country.64 In particular,
China made the following concessions: (1) the location of the ownership or
development of an IP right will not result in a preference in procurement for
products or services based upon those rights; (2) local telecommunications
operators will be allowed to select products freely that will provide upgrades or
advanced services to China's existing 3G technology; and (3) a "Special
Campaign" against counterfeiting and piracy, including internet piracy, will be
launched."
Despite the official press release of the Joint Commission on December
15, 2010, subsequent developments have demonstrated the depth of the
disagreement that remains. Just one week later, on December 22, 2010, the US
sought the intervention of the WTO with respect to China's application of its
Indigenous Innovation Policies to the domestic wind power industry." The US
complaint derived from a petition filed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
27, 2011). See also Office of the United States Trade Representative, China Agrees to Signficant IP
Rsghts Enforcement, Market Opening, and Revisions to Indigenous Innovation Poliies That Will Hep Boost
U.S. Export (Dec 2010), online at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/pressreleases/2010/december/us-china-joint-commission-commerce-and-trade-2010 (visited Oct 27,
2011) (USTR Joint Commission).
63
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1974 by the United Steelworkers Union (USW).1 7 USW contended that China
was subsidizing development of its domestic industry by requiring domestically
manufactured components at the expense of imports." China has since agreed
to abandon the subsidies, demonstrating its willingness to make progress toward
an amicable solution.69
On June 28, 2011, the MOF posted on its website a statement that China
had at its highest level of government officially repealed three key Indigenous
Most significantly, it abandoned the Evaluation
Innovation measures.
Measures on Indigenous Innovative Products for Government Procurement,
which provides price and technical evaluation preferences.7 It also canceled the
Administrative Measures on Budgeting for Government Procurement of
Indigenous Innovation Products, which details rules and procedures for
government entities that use state funds to procure accredited Indigenous
Innovation products, and the Administrative Measures on Government
Procurement Contracts for Indigenous Innovation Products, which encourages
government entities to use state procurement contracts to promote Indigenous
Innovation.7 2
While it is clear that the Indigenous Innovation Policies have recently
entered a rapid state of flux at the highest level of government, it is unclear
whether the policy changes have translated into action at the local government
level-where the ultimate responsibility for administering the changes lies. If the
policies have been truly abandoned, the action represents significant progress
toward an amicable resolution, although many of the other Indigenous
Innovation measures would remain in effect. US-China Business Council
(USCBC) President John Frisbie commented in a June 29, 2011, statement:
Though the measures represent only a portion of the full list of regulations
that tie indigenous innovation and government procurement, the
elimination of those measures is an important step toward fulfilling pledges

68
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Challenged by the United States in WITO Dispute (june 2011), online at http://www.ustr.gov/aboutus/press-office/press-releases/201 1/june/china-ends-wind-power-equipment-subsidieschallenged (visited Oct 27, 2011).
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made by [Chinese] leaders during President Hu Jintao's January 2011 visit to
the United States and the May 2011 Strategic and Economic Dialogue.7 3
IV. LEGALITY UNDER TRIPS AND GPA
In their current form, the Indigenous Innovation Policies still potentially
clash with a host of China's WTO commitments and obligations, including its
transparency, subsidies, and proper administration obligations. 74 This Comment
focuses on potential conflicts with two particularly important treaties. First, it
explores potential issues arising under Articles 3, 20, and 27 of TRIPS, to which
China is a signatory." Second, the Comment explains why the Indigenous
Innovation Policies are almost assuredly impermissible under the GPA, which
China committed to ratifying when it joined the WTO in 2001. Importantly,
China has not yet ratified the GPA, since the first two membership proposals it
submitted in 2007 and 2010 were rejected.7 ' Nevertheless, if its commitment to
join is to be taken seriously, an analysis of potential conflicts with the GPA
remains an important undertaking. The requirements of these treaties and the
legal status of the Indigenous Innovation Policies under each are analyzed
below.
A. Potential Conflicts of Indigenous Innovation Policies
under TRIPS
1. Article 3: National treatment.
The first provision of TRIPS that may be implicated is Article 3, which
pertains to national treatment. Article 3 reads in relevant part:
1. Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no
lessfavourable than that it accords to its own nationalswith regard to the protection

of intellectual property, subject to the exceptions already provided....
73
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Members may avail themselves of the exceptions permitted under

paragraph 1 ...

only where such exceptions are necessary to secure

compliance with laws and regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement and where such practices are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a disguised restriction on trade.77
Because case law interpreting Article 3 is extremely sparse, it is difficult to
predict how the WTO Arbitration Panel (the Panel) will rule in a given instance.
In the closest case on point, Indonesia-Autos,the Panel examined a US complaint
against Indonesia regarding its National Car Program, which required
participating vehicles to bear a unique, domestically owned Indonesian
trademark." The US claimed that the Indonesian law discriminated against
nationals of other WTO member nations with respect to the "acquisition" and
"maintenance" of trademark rights as specified in footnote 3 to Article 3, which
defines the type of "protection" contemplated by TRIPS "[to] include matters
affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and enforcement of intellectual
property rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property
rights specifically addressed in this Agreement."
The Panel rejected both claims.o With respect to the acquisition of
trademarks, the Panel reasoned that the Program merely stipulated that only
certain signs could be used as trademarks, and there was no evidence that rights
to marks excluded from the Program could not be obtained in a nondiscriminatory manner under Indonesian law." The same logic arguably applies
in the case of Indigenous Innovation Policies. Within the national process of
registering trademarks, the Policies do not discriminate against non-Chinese
entities, even though they heavily incentivize companies to undertake costly
foreign registration activities that could otherwise be saved. Under the Panel's
reasoning, Article 3 presents no more of a conflict in the case of Indigenous
Innovation than in Indonesia-Autos.
The maintenance of trademarks was also an issue in Indonesia-Autos. The
US claimed that potentially successful partners in the National Car Program
would be unlikely to use their global marks in Indonesia for fear of creating
confusion, and consequently it would be more likely that the global mark would
be subject to cancellation for non-use in Indonesia.8 2 The Panel explained that
77
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See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Indonesia-Certain Measures Affecting the
Automobile Industry
6.21-6.27, WTO Doc No WT/DS54,55,59,64/R (July 2, 1998) (IndonesiaAutos Panel Report).

I

79

TRIPS, Art 3 n 3 (cited in note 5) (emphasis added).

80

See Indonesia-Autos Panel Report at % 14.269, 14.271 (cited in note 78).

s1

See id at

14.268.

82

See id at

14.270.

Winter 2012

769

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

foreign companies would enter into such arrangements willingly-fully aware of
any consequent implications for their ability to maintain pre-existing trademark
rights. 83
Under this logic, a similar outcome would likely be dictated with respect to
Indigenous Innovation Policies. If a company desires to make its products
eligible for Indigenous Innovation preferences in China, any implications
regarding its ability to maintain its trademarks are clear from the beginning, and
the choice to proceed is entirely voluntary.
Importantly, the Panel suggested that the Program might give rise to
questions regarding the scope of the use of trademarks owned by US companies
on cars under the National Car Program.8 4 Since a "scope" claim was not
actually brought, the Panel did not provide further guidance on the requirements
that would need to be fulfilled in order for a violation to be found. There is a
strong argument, however, that the identical provision is implicated to the same
extent in the instant case. Both sets of laws impose problematic institutional
barriers against foreign competition. In both situations, foreign corporations are
clearly treated less favorably than domestic companies. The question is whether
these preferences implicate the scope of trademark rights in a strict textual sense,
which is permissible under the Panel's interpretive framework, or whether they
are more indirectly implicated, and therefore lie outside the intended reach of
TRIPS.
"Scope" is not further defined in TRIPS. In other WTO proceedings, the
Appellate Body has ascertained the ordinary meanings of relevant terms using
standard dctionary definitions." The American Heritage Dictionary defines
"scope" as "the range of ... actions" or "breadth or opportunity to function.""
The IP right at issue with regard to scope is essentially the right to exclude. The
"scope" of the right to exclude is subject to at least two conflicting
interpretations. On the one hand, market pressure that tends to make purchasers
of technology prefer a different product may be interpreted as necessarily
limiting the IP holders' right to exclude, since they cannot meaningfully exclude
people who have been incentivized not to purchase their products. On the other
hand, the market demand for a product is arguably separate from the legal right
to exclude potential purchasers of the product, and the exclusionary right cannot
ever operate meaningfully beyond the confines of the product's existing market.
83
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Under that interpretation, the laws affect simply the market for the product,
leaving the right to exclude conferred by trademarks or patents intact.
In deciding which interpretation to pursue, the Indonesia-Autos Panel
suggests that TRIPS provisions should be interpreted using a textualist
approach." For example, the Panel rejected an argument that holders of foreign
trademarks are at a defacto disadvantage because the tariff, internal tax, and other
benefits to which the Indonesian company was entitled gave it a competitive
advantage." Rather, TRIPS provisions need to be interpreted narrowly so as not
to read in obligations that extend beyond a literal interpretation of the text."
Under the Panel's interpretation, there is no inherent unfairness in requiring a
company either in Indonesia or China to register its IP domestically because
such a system necessarily subjects foreign competitors to exactly the same
provisions as it does its own firms.
There is, however, a compelling argument that even though these
arguments only indirectly implicate the "acquisition" and "maintenance" of
trademarks, they directly affect the "scope" of potential use. Genuine "National
Treatment" would permit every company to pursue IP protection in its own
home country, rather than require companies based in other countries essentially
to establish Chinese brands, to transfer their R&D to China, and to prosecute
their patents and trademarks in China.90 The inconvenience and expense
involved with such a process, combined with the inherent risks of the Chinese
IP system, are significant. Moreover, it would be impossible to maintain a world
marketplace in which every country required that every company wanting to do
business within its borders originally register its IP in that country. It would be
entirely reasonable for the Panel to rule that the "scope" of trademark rights is
diminished under these circumstances. Indeed, such a requirement for IP
registration is unprecedented and out of alignment with international best
practices.9

It should be noted that Article 3 does provide a safe harbor for the few
exceptions listed above. Although they do not apply in the current situation, the
instructions listed in determining when to apply them provide useful policy
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guidance on how to construe Article 3 more generally.92 An exception may be
used only where (1) it is necessary to secure compliance with laws and
regulations not inconsistent with TRIPS, and (2) it is not applied so as to effect a
disguised trade restriction.93 At least one industry lobbyist has accused China of
doing just that, saying that it"has thoroughly examined all the [loop]holes in the
WTO system and it is working to drive trucks through those holes."9 4 It is
arguable that such a practice is not only a disguised restriction on trade but
materially affects the scope of IP protection afforded by Article 3. Under this
interpretation, an Article 3 claim may be viable.
2. Article 20: Other requirements.
The second TRIPS provision potentially implicated is Article 20, which
pertains to other requirements. It reads, in part:
The use of a trademark in the course of trade shall not be unjustifiably
encumbered by special requirements, such as use with another trademark,
use in a special form or use in a manner detrimental to its capability to
distinguish the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings.9 5
Under this Article, the relevant question is whether the Indigenous
Innovation accreditation lists' requirement that a qualifying product's trademark
be initially registered in China constitutes a "special requirement" that
unjustifiably encumbers the use of a foreign company's trademarks.
The Panel in Indonesia-Autos considered this issue in the context of the
National Car Program in conjunction with its Article 3 discussion. In that case,
the US made two Article 20 arguments using much of the same logic as in its
Article 3 claims. First, it argued that the requirements of the National Car
Program would encumber a foreign company from using the trademark it used
elsewhere in the Program. The Panel rejected this claim. It reasoned:
[1]f a foreign company enters into an arrangement with a Pioneer company
it does so voluntarily and in the knowledge of any consequent implications
for its ability to use any pre-existing trademark. In these circumstances, we
do not consider the provisions of the National Car Programme as they
relate to trademarks can be construed as "requirements", in the sense of
Article 20.96
92
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Under this interpretation, the Panel construed the term "requirement" to
be a constraint on the foreign company's business behavior rather than on the
requirements of the program into which it may choose to enter. There is room
to argue that this logic is erroneous and should be reconsidered when applied to
the current facts. Of course, any foreign company may choose to participate or
not to participate in the National Car Program. It is the use of the trademark
that is not allowed to be encumbered by special requirements, not a company's
business decision to participate or not. It is difficult to imagine a scenario that
more starkly violates the requirement that the use of a trademark not be "in a
special form or ... a manner detrimental to its capability to distinguish the
goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings" than
the facts in Indonesia-Autos, or what sort of scenarios the Panel would imagine
fall within the ambit of Article 20 at all. Regardless, it seems the only realistic
opportunity to win on this claim would be to urge the Panel to reconsider its
prior ruling.
The Panel also rejected the US' "competitive disadvantage" argument (also
advanced with respect to Article 3 violations) because any disadvantages flowing
from the Program's provisions cannot be construed as "requirements" under
Article 20. In the case of Indigenous Innovation, the "competitive disadvantage"
line of reasoning is potentially the strongest line of argument against the policies
that exist. Indeed, the primary reason for exploring a legal claim is the
competitive advantage produced by the policies. It is difficult to see how any
other claim could be brought more successfully.
3. Article 27: Patentable subject matter.
Finally, Indigenous Innovation Policies potentially implicate Article 27 of
TRIPS, which pertains to patentable subject matter. Article 27 reads:
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application. Subject to paragraph 4 of Article 65,
paragraph 8 of Article 70 and paragraph 3 of this Article, patents shall be
available andpatent rtights enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention,
the field of technology and whetherproducts are imported or locally produced.

In Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents, the Panel explained that the term
"discrimination" potentially encompasses a broad array of meanings." It

97

TRIPS, Art 27 (cited in note 5) (emphasis added).

98

See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, Canada-PatentProtection of Pharmaceutical
at
17,
2000),
online
R
(Mar
WT/DS114/
171
1
7.94,
Products
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/7428d.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2011) (CanadaPharmaceuticalPatents Panel Report).

Winter 2012

773

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

cautioned against defining the term prematurely. Instead, it advised that
"discrimination" be construed in a case-by-case manner within the precise
context of the issue at hand."
There is no precedent advising how to interpret the phrase "whether
products are imported or locally produced,"' 00 which is the most relevant
consideration to the facts at hand. Nevertheless, the Panel provided the
following policy guidance:
It is quite plausible, as the EC argued, that the TRIPS Agreement would
want to require governments to apply exceptions in a non-discriminatory
manner, in order to ensure that governments do not succumb to domestic
pressures to limit exceptions to areas where right holders tend to be foreign
producers. 10o
It is plausible that the Indigenous Innovation Policies do exactly that, but a
significant ambiguity in this provision makes it questionable whether they cut
into the ability of foreign rights holders to enjoy the benefits of the IP. On the
one hand, the provision could be interpreted to impose a duty on individual
countries not to deny patents on the basis of the field of technology or the
location of the developing company. Under this interpretation, the Indigenous
Innovation Policies pose no problem-any company is welcome to patent its
technology in China if it possesses the usual requirements for patentability.
On the other hand, this language could be interpreted to confer to
individual inventors the right to patent their products in whatever jurisdiction
they please, without being unduly restrained by requirements involving the place
of invention, the field of technology, and whether products are imported or
locally produced. Under this interpretation, if an inventor in the EU wishes to
patent in the EU, out of concerns of convenience or otherwise, but is required
to patent in China if he or she wishes to do any business with China or Chinese
firms, then the inventor's right to do so is curtailed by the Indigenous
Innovation restriction. This reading seems more in line with the policy goals of
TRIPS and suggests a violation by China.
This second interpretation assumes that the practical restraint local IP
registration imposes on foreign inventors makes patent rights not "enjoyable"
but merely "possible"-even if impractical or far less than desirable. To a large
degree, the correct statutory interpretation depends on how "enjoyable" is
defined. Once again, there is no case law to guide this inquiry. Though the
correct answer remains elusive, it does not seem plausible that a treaty whose
purpose is to impose minimum protections to promote free trade among
99
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member nations was intended to allow one nation to impose such a lopsided and
restrictive requirement. Whether China has successfully passed through a
loophole with regard to this provision remains an open question.
B. China's Broader Legal Obligations: Potential Conflicts
under the GPA
The GPA is the core agreement regulating government procurement
regulations of member countries. Its purpose is to ensure that foreign products
and services are treated no less favorably in government procurement than
domestic oneS.102 It does, however, have five annexes limiting signatories'
obligations, and each signatory may include exceptions in their General Notes.'0 3
In particular, there is significant latitude for policies that spur local innovation.
For example, the US excludes from the agreement (1) small businesses, which
policy enables smaller contracts to be directed to innovative small businesses;
and (2) R&D activities, which allows the most innovative awards to be directed
to local enterprises.10 4 Because accession to the GPA is voluntary, it is not a
WTO violation to engage in discriminatory government procurement
preferences under the GPA until it is ratified.
China agreed to join the GPA as soon as possible when it became a
member of the WTO in December 2001.10 But the current signatories rejected
China's initial proposal for accession, which it submitted in 2007. Most
significantly, China failed to commit sub-central government agencies, exempted
state-owned enterprises, contained high thresholds, and included a fifteen-year
grace period during which China would not have to implement any GPA
A revised proposal submitted in 2010 was likewise rejected
obligations.'
because many of the original shortcomings remained unaddressed. Most

102
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importantly, it did not address the provisions concerning provincial and local
government agencies, or state-owned enterprises, both of which continue to be
major issues.o' Negotiations on proper terms of acceptance continue as of this
Comment's publication.
If China does eventually accede to the GPA, the current Indigenous
Innovation Policies would contravene Article III, on National Treatment and
Non-Discrimination, which requires that government procurement treat foreign
products no less favorably than domestic ones.'" Article V, on Special and
Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, does allow developing
countries to negotiate special terms with the current signatories that apply only
to them.0' So far, these terms, too, have been heavily disputed in the two
proposed accession offers. Once terms are agreed upon, they will be mutually
binding on all signatories.
V. INDIGENOUS INNOVATION ECONOMICS AND LEGAL
SOLUTIONS FOR FUTURE GROWTH
A. Indigenous Innovation Policies May Be Neither
Strategically Nor Economically Sound
The Chinese government believes the strategy of affording Chinese firms
preferential treatment in government procurement is essential to furthering the
country's technological development." 0 The idea potentially derives from
China's experience with low-end manufacturing. China believes that domestic
companies will grow and flourish when they are given time to innovate and
capture enough market share to scale up their production."'
However, there is significant reason to doubt that this solution holds the
same promise for higher-end production. In fact, there is considerable evidence
to suggest that protecting a market actually destroys innovation because it
diminishes individual companies' incentives to compete.112 A National Bureau of
Economic Research (NBER) study of Japan's choices with respect to high-tech
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innovation and trade policy in the 1980s supports such a conclusion." 3 The
study demonstrates that a country that introduces high-tech production
subsidies "will see its competitiveness in high-technology products grow, but its
long-run rate of indigenous innovation decline."" 4 In fact, it found that by
"implicitly subsidizing" the production of high-tech products via government
procurement practices, Japan "reduce[d] the rate of innovation in the policy
active country, increased the rate of innovation in the trade partner country, and
slowed the global rate of technological progress."" 5
In short, firms seem to invest in productivity-enhancing innovation only if
competition forces them to do so. World trade and global innovation flourish
because the pool of ideas off of which to build becomes greater and more
diverse, and because the brainpower and perspective available to solve critical
problems increase dramatically. This same policy reasoning underpins the TRIPS
agreement itself. Innovation and world trade are not zero-sum games; all players
can profit provided that they all play by the rules. Conversely, when one country
attempts to circumvent the rules and shield its firms from the competition
necessary to make such a system thrive, not only does it lose out-the rest of
the world does as well. Thus, China would be best advised to abandon its
Indigenous Innovation Policies outright and in their place institute policies that
implement the recommendations detailed below.
B. Alternative Strategies for Stimulating Indigenous
Innovation
As suggested, potentially the most important step for China to take is to
open its markets to the fierce competition of the world marketplace-perhaps
the strongest force that drives innovation. Mounting political pressure from the
international community may provide even more incentive for China to open its
markets. The EU recently issued a forceful warning that although "China is
important for Europe, Europe is even more important for China," admonishing
that China must open its economy to further trade and investment if it wants to
continue doing business with Europe."' The warning was rooted in the strongly
held beliefs that opening up markets creates more innovative, prosperous and
stable societies, and would ultimately be to both China's and the EU's benefit."'
113
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In addition to opening up its markets, China should take at least two
further steps to promote its technological development: (1) increasing
government investment in R&D with an eye toward future technologies, rather
than establish product lists focused on existing technologies; and (2)
strengthening IP protection within China. Both of these steps represent fair,
legal, and productive measures to help innovation thrive in China in the future.
1. Increase government investment in R&D.
The five GPA Annexes leave a range of loopholes that enable governments
to play a key role in fostering innovation. Substantial governmental investment
in R&D, available through Annex IV, provides one attractive and reliable
method of generating sustainable innovation."' The government effectively acts
as a customer to innovative companies and incentivizes them to develop
solutions to problems that the whole country, rather than individual consumers,
maintains an interest in solving."' These innovations provide a vital complement
to technologies developed by companies that focus primarily on selling products
valuable only to individual consumers.
A prime example of an effective implementation of this strategy is the US
government's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program.'" Through
the SBIR, the US government places its own R&D contracts with small
businesses focusing on the development of new technologies to provide an
incentive to develop innovative technologies that address the US' needs. The
program thus plays both de-risking and funding roles that are crucial to
developing valuable ideas that would otherwise not attract the resources to
mature them into quality solutions.'2 '
Another effective way to stimulate R&D is to provide non-discriminatory
tax concessions for R&D-related activities. Australia, for example, provides tax
concessions of up to 175 percent for R&D expenditures, in addition to investing
118

See id at 6-7.

119

See id at 11.

120

The US Defense Department's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program funds earlystage R&D at small technology companies and is designed to stimulate technological innovation,
increase private sector commercialization of federal R&D, increase small business participation in
federally funded R&D, and foster participation by minority and disadvantaged firms in
technological innovation. For an overview of the program, see Department of Defense, Small
Business Innovation Research, Small Business Technology Transfer (2011), online at http://www.sbir.gov
(visited Oct 30, 2011).

121 See David Connell, "Secrets" of the World's Laegest Seed CapitalFund: How the United States Government
Uses its Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Programme and Procurement Budgets to Support Small
Technolog Firms, **1, 2 (Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge July 2006), online
at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/SBIR%20Full/o20Report.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2011). See also
Carnegie Paper at *11 (cited in note 104).

778

Vol 12 No. 2

China'sIndigenous Innovation Policies Under TRIPS and GPA

Boumil

billions of dollars per year directly in R&D.'22 In fact, one Boston Consulting
Group (BCG) study indicates that R&D tax credits are among the most
common and most effective incentives that countries use to stimulate
innovation.123 With respect to China, however, the study notes that China's most
significant innovation tax incentive, the High- and New-Technology Enterprise
Program, requires that core IP rights be owned or registered in China.' 24 This
very likely limits the effectiveness of attracting foreign R&D investment to
China.125
Large government purchases of technology can also hinder innovation if
they start to show a continuing preference for established solutions.126 It is
crucial that government procurement focus on the R&D stage, during which
new technologies are developed, rather than on mature products, for which the
local government (and the rest of the world) does not reap a return on
investment. Product lists focus inherently on existing technologies rather than
the future innovations they are designed to stimulate.'2 7 In addition, the national
lists, at least in their current form, interact with the many smaller, provincial lists
in confusing and contradictory ways, giving rise to substantial inefficiencies in
implementing the system as a whole.128
2. Strengthen IP protection within China.
The IP enforcement regime in China is widely characterized as lax and
ineffective.129 The problems are deep-rooted and widespread, ranging from mere
inadequacy of coordination among the various government enforcement
agencies to corruption, protectionism, and perceived incentives by enforcement
officials to overlook infringement activities. 3 0 Criminal penalties are rarely
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applied, and civil penalties are often not substantial enough to deter future
infringement activity."'
The consequences of a lax IP enforcement regime are straightforward:
institutions and companies will be less likely to conduct innovative activities in
regions in which their IP rights are not likely to be protected. One 2009 BCG
study found that business executives consider the IP rights enforcement
problem a top issue because of the implications for lost revenue. Consequently,
business leaders are likely to decide to conduct their innovation activities
elsewhere. 13 2 The European Chamber also has argued that there is a need for
greatly heightened IP protection in China."' It urges that if IP is not sufficiently
protected, (1) Chinese enterprises will be deterred from investing in innovation,
and (2) European companies will be discouraged from further transferring
technology to China. It also highlighted a growing concern among European
companies that confidential information is frequently leaked at various stages of
business development (such as project approvals, product certification, and
patent filings), which would further deter European companies from transferring
technology to China.'34
VI. CONCLUSION
Recent efforts by the Chinese government to foster Indigenous
Innovation, particularly those that afford preferences in government
procurement to domestic entities, potentially contravene several important
international trade agreements. Moreover, they represent questionable policy
both for China and its trading partners. This Comment has argued that China's
most productive strategy for becoming a twenty-first century leader in
technology and innovation centers around opening up free trade, instituting
much stronger IP rights protections, and implementing more robust and nondiscriminatory tax and R&D incentives. In the business of global innovation, all
players can win as long as they all abide by the mutually agreed-upon rules
embodied in WTO treaties such as TRIPS and the GPA.
Although China has recently halted several of its Indigenous Innovation
initiatives at the national level, there is substantial reason to be skeptical that the
policies will be curtailed in practice. The provincial government agencies
responsible for implementing national policy still appear to have Indigenous
Innovation product catalogues in effect, and a commitment by the national
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government to halt Indigenous Innovation may or may not translate to
meaningful action at the local level. As with all major development plans in
China, the central Chinese government promulgated broad principles providing
guidance for implementing Indigenous Innovation Policies. Then, the relevant
ministries and commissions-both central and local-created specific measures
implementing the overarching policy objectives."' As it is, many of the local
Indigenous Innovation catalogues and laws conflict with each other and the
broader national laws. The process of implementation has begun, and full-scale
reversal may not actually be occurring, despite rhetoric from the national
government.
Indigenous Innovation Policies are evolving quickly, and enforcement of
most policies has not yet begun. Moreover, much of the concern voiced by the
US and EU reflects fear of future Chinese policies and the way new laws may be
implemented. It remains unclear how the new policies will play out in effect, and
to what extent discriminatory measures will actually be implemented. On June
25, 2009, Premier Wen Jiabao reaffirmed that China seeks to maintain a fair and
open market environment, and that China would never discriminate against
foreign enterprises or products."' Fulfilling this promise would represent a
significant step toward bringing China into compliance with its TRIPS and GPA
obligations and commitments, and would help to propel China into the position
of technological leadership it desires to occupy.
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